Prejudice, exclusion, and compensating transfers: the economics of ethnic segregation

Prejudiced groups self-segregate and exclude others. This is observed in South African apartheid, in the exclusion of Eastern European or Muslim immigrants from Western Europe and in ghettos formed by immigrants in many countries. In the United States, minorities (mostly African Americans) are segregated in central cities and wealthier European Americans reside predominantly in the suburbs. A fully closed general equilibrium model of the last case is presented. The model treats land, labor and product markets. Most whites flee the inner city for white-dominated suburbs. This benefits blacks by lowering inner city rents relative to wages. When whites are weakly prejudiced, exclusion from the suburbs hurts whites as well as blacks. But when whites are strongly prejudiced, a lump sum endowment transfer from whites to blacks can split the gains-from-trade: whites can pay transfers to blacks in exchange for blacks accepting exclusion. The transfer needed to compensate blacks is large if blacks are strongly hurt by exclusion and small if they are only slightly hurt. How much transfers to US central cities and to the poor compensate American blacks for the effects of exclusion is an open question.     

Model-based control charts in phase 1 statistical process control

In this paper, a general method of constructing control charts for preliminary analysis of individual observations is presented, which is based on recursive score residuals. A simulation study shows that certain implementations of these charts are highly effective in detecting assignable causes.     

Corporate moral agency: A case from literature

I analyze a well-known and moving passage from John Steinbeck's novelThe Grapes of Wrath. This passage provides an excellent illustration of one of the central questions about corporate moral agency: Is corporate moral agency anything over and above the agency of individual human beings? The passage in question is a debate about whether or not the actions of a particular company are anything over and above the actions of individual human beings.     

Is Index Performance Achievable? An Analysis of Australian Equity Index Funds

This article examines the performance of index equity funds in Australia. Despite the significant growth in index funds since 1976, when the first index mutual fund was launched in the U.S., research on their performance is sparse in the U.S. and non-existent in Australia. This study documents the existence of significant tracking error for Australian index funds. For example, the magnitude of the difference between index fund returns and index returns averages between 7.4 and 22.3 basis points per month across index funds operating for more than five years. However, there is little evidence of bias in tracking error implying that these funds neither systematically outperform nor underperform their benchmark on a before cost basis. Further analysis provides evidence that the magnitude of tracking error is related to fund cash flows, market volatility, transaction costs and index replication strategies used by the manager.     

Political feasibility of structural adjustment in africa: an application of SAM mixed multipliers

The implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) has often been undermined by opposition from politically powerful groups who are favored by existing policies. To assess the political sustainability of SAPs this paper uses social accounting matrices for three African countries to model the income effects of stylized SAPs on different socioeconomic groups. The analysis reveals wide variation in the likelihood for typical SAPs to be acceptable to political elites while generating growth in the rest of the economy. The presence of a rural elite or strong farm-nonfarm linkages can enhance the political sustainability of SAPs.     

Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior

Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth. Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University of Mannheim is acknowledged. RID="*" ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de)     

Convertibility risk: the precautionary demand for foreign currency in a crisis

This paper presents theoretical work linking money demand to the perceptions of households about the risk that domestic currency may become inconvertible or that it may be devalued. An empirical investigation of the size of this effect is carried out using monthly data for Korea to estimate an augmented demand-for-money equation. It is found that the fear of inconvertibility arising from the 1997 Korean currency crisis may have caused broad money demand to fall by 4–5% points,equivalent to the loss of reserves of $6–7.5 billion (or about 30% of reserves as measured at end-November 1997). This is a revised version of IMF Working paper WP/2001/210; it was written while Professor Black was Senior Policy Advisor at the IMF Institute and Christofides and Mourmouras were staff members in the IMF’s Policy Development and Review Department. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. For useful comments and suggestions we thank an anonymous referee, Tim Lane, Ydahlia Metzgen, Roberto Perelli, Tony Richards, Christian Mulder, Steve Russell, as well as seminar participants at the IMF Institute, the IMF’s Asia and Pacific Department, Federal Reserve Board, and Bank of Indonesia. We would also like to note similar (unpublished) empirical results using our approach by Dr. Rino Effendi for Indonesia and Angana Banerji for Russia     

Differences in the Cost of Trade Execution Services on Floor-Based and Electronic Futures Markets

This paper provides new evidence on the impact of electronic trading on brokerage commissions by investigating a sample period that covers the period of transition from floor to electronic trading on the Sydney Futures Exchange. After controlling for liquidity, volatility and broker identity, the introduction of electronic trading remains to be associated with lower brokerage commissions relative to floor markets. The study also provides new evidence on brokerage commissions in futures markets finding that commission fees charged on futures trades average 0.002% of transaction value. This is up to 120 times smaller than the magnitude of brokerage fees charged in stock markets, and considerably lower than the magnitude of brokerage fees assumed for futures markets in previous research. Consistent with existing studies based on stock markets, commissions charged per contract decrease with order size reflecting economies of scale in the provision of brokerage services in futures markets. Commission rates are positively related to bid-ask spreads and price volatility, which proxy for the probability of execution error costs and execution difficulty, respectively. Finally, the identity of the broker is found to be a significant determinant of commissions reflecting different pricing schedules across brokers.